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Lottery and ra²e mechanisms have a long history as economic institutions for
raising funds. In a series of laboratory experiments we ¯nd that total spending in
ra²es is much higher than Nash equilibrium predicts. Moreover, this overspending
is persistent as the number of participants in the ra²e increases. Subjects as a
group do not strategically reduce spending as group sizes increase, in contrast to
the comparative statics theory provides. The lack of strategic response cannot
be explained by learning direction theory or level-k reasoning models, although
quantal response equilibrium can ¯t the observed distribution of choices. Much of
the observed spending levels in the larger groups cannot be explained by ¯nancial
incentives.
Keywords: Lottery, ra²e, contest, laboratory experiments.
JEL classi¯cation: C72, C92, D72.
1 Introduction
Lotteries are one of the oldest economic institutions. Chance drawings are reputed
to have been used to help ¯nance the construction of the Great Wall of China. The
1longevity of lotteries can be attributed directly to their e®ectiveness at raising money.
Proponents of games of chance as a mechanism for raising funds have framed them as
a sort of \voluntary tax." U.S. Founding Father Thomas Je®erson wrote in support of
lotteries,
A lottery is a salutary instrument and a tax...laid on the willing only, that
is to say, on those who can risk the price of a ticket without sensible injury,
for the possibility of a higher prize.
The \voluntary tax" argument (see for example Clotfelter and Cook, 1987) has appeared
many times throughout history. For example, in 1967-68, the city of Montreal sought
to defray some of the expenses from the Expo '67 World's Fair by running a ra²e with
a prize of up to $100,000 in silver bars.
If lotteries are pro¯table, then it follows that at least some, and probably many, par-
ticipants in the lottery are making choices that result in negative expected returns, in the
sense that they would be better o® in expected monetary terms if they sat out the lot-
tery. In the most prominent national lotteries worldwide, and state lotteries in the U.S.,
lotteries are structured such that a participant has a very small chance of winning a very
large prize. One behavioral explanation for the massive participation in these lotteries is
that they o®er participants a \chance to buy hope" (see Clotfelter and Cook, 1989, 1990;
Cook and Clotfelter, 1993). Another line of argument asserts that people tend to be
poor at assessing and processing very small probabilities, so the minuscule probabilities
of hitting it big in these lotteries are incorporated in decision-making only after some
transformations. The idea of probability weighting has a component of prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The experimental evidence for probability weighting
is mixed; for example, Harbaugh et al. (2002) ¯nd that elicited probability weighting
functions depend on the frame of the experimental task. This result indicates that,
even if a probability weighting function is not per se a well-de¯ned construct in the
psychology of an agent's decision-making, framing remains an important component of
the decision process.
Lottery mechanisms are frequently used to generate revenue on a much smaller scale.
Particularly in the United States, charities, school groups, churches, and the like often
hold lotteries, more commonly referred to as \ra²es," for fund-raising purposes. In
2these cases, grand prizes typically range in value from a few hundred dollars to prizes
on the order of a new vehicle. Prizes of this level, while still attractive, do not evoke
fantasies of massive riches. The target audience for these ra²es is small, with most
tickets being purchased by members of a local community. Therefore, the probability of
winning the grand prize is orders of magnitude larger than in a state-run lottery. This
minimizes the scope at which the explanations cited above are likely to be operable in
ra²es of this scale. A confounding factor in understanding behavior in these ra²es is
that, since these are used as fund-raisers for worthy causes, participants may purchase
tickets in part or in whole out of charitable motives (see Morgan, 2000). Nonetheless,
since ra²es are common even when direct appeals for contributions are possible, ra²es
must o®er some additional fund-raising bene¯ts over direct appeals.
We directly investigate the pro¯tability of ra²es using a controlled laboratory ex-
periment in which small probabilities, large prizes, and charitable motives are all absent.
We systematically vary the number of participants in the ra²e across sessions to ¯nd
the minimum group size needed for a ra²e to become pro¯table. In doing so, we can
directly observe the strategic response of agents to the change in group size. Our main
result is that a ra²e shows a pro¯t when the number of participants is at least four,
which is very small compared to most ra²es in the ¯eld. The behavioral underpinning of
this result is that participants do not react strategically to the change in the number of
other participants in the ra²e. Individual participants spend about the same amount on
ra²e tickets irrespective of the size of the group. Additionally, as the size of the group
increases, participants less frequently adjust their spending based on the previous out-
comes. Therefore, our results propose a new explanation for ra²e pro¯tability: as the
population of participants grows, individuals do not react in a strategically sophisticated
way, and as a result, a ra²e generates pro¯t.
Our ra²e design o®ers several properties which are favorable for laboratory study.
There is a commonly-known number N of participants who have the opportunity to pur-
chase ra²e tickets for a ¯xed prize of $10. Each participant i simultaneously purchases
an amount xi of tickets; each ticket costs one cent. One ticket is drawn from among
those purchased; the purchaser of that ticket wins the prize. Therefore, the chance of
participant i winning the prize is
xi P
j xj. Mathematically, this formulation is isomorphic
with Tullock's (1980) basic model of contest theory, with the exponent r in his model
3set to 1. A main theoretical result in that literature is that when agents are risk-neutral
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium where the total amount spent by all players is
less than the value of the prize. This result is at odds with the experimental results we
report here.
We therefore turn to alternative models of motivation or bounded rationality for
further insights into our data. The lottery contest has a clear competitive component,
in that at the end of the game there is one and only one winner. Therefore, it is plausible
that subjects might care not just about earnings but also about relative performance.
In that case, subject behavior would conform to an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).
In a ¯nite population, Hehenkamp et al. (2004) show that the ESS is greater than
the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium, but ESS spending levels decrease as the number of
participants increases, which does not match our ¯ndings.
Neither Nash equilibrium nor ESS o®er predictions to organize the heterogeneity we
observe in spending levels. We therefore investigate the predictions of Quantal Response
Equilbrium (QRE, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), which maintains a mutual best-reply
assumption while allowing for noisy observation of expected payo®s. QRE ¯ts the
qualitative and quantitative features of our data. Our estimates are consistent with the
hypothesis that the ¯nancial consequences of actions are less important in determining
individual behavior as the group size increases.
We then analyze other behavioral models in order to get some clues as to why in-
dividual behavior becomes less ¯nancially driven as group sizes increase. Removing
the equilibrium assumption, we consider models of level-k reasoning (see, e.g., Stahl
and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Nagel, 1995; Ho, Camerer and Weigelt, 1998; Costa-Gomes,
Crawford and Broseta, 2001; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006; Crawford and Iriberri,
2007) where players exhibiting higher levels of strategic sophistication choose best re-
sponses to the play of players with lower levels of sophistication. Finally, we look at
period-by-period adjustment behavior using myopic heuristics and compare them to
the predictions of learning direction theory (Selten and Buchta, 1994; and Selten and
Chmura, 2008). Although level-k reasoning and learning direction theory result in poor
predictions in terms of the observed distribution of choices, they provide a common and
consistent message: individuals do not react in a strategically sophisticated way as the
population of participants grows.
4Our design and our analysis of the data ¯ll in some gaps in the literature on contests
in the laboratory. The results of Millner and Pratt (1989); Potters, de Vries and van
Wind (1998); Davis and Reilly (1998); Fonseca (2009) indicate that subjects exceeded
the risk-neutral equilibrium predictions for spending.1 In all these studies, a signi¯cant
fraction of subjects chooses spending levels which are not rationalizable for risk-neutral
participants. The literature has not given much attention to the formal study of the
structure of the individual-level spending decisions, although Potters, de Vries and van
Wind (1998), in their concluding remarks, hypothesize about the possibility that some
players might make their choices in response to previous outcomes. We show that the
Quantal Response Equilibrium organizes the distribution of individual spending, and we
con¯rm the conjecture of Potters, de Vries and van Wind (1998) that there are adaptive
players in the population, at least when the number of participants is small.
Anderson and Sta®ord (2003) is the ¯rst study to focus speci¯cally on the e®ects
of group size. They employ a one-shot design, so subjects do not have an opportunity
to learn or adapt. They ¯nd individual spending exceeds the risk-neutral Nash equilib-
rium prediction, and that individual spending decreases as the number of participants
increases. We were not able to replicate their second result in a setting where our par-
ticipants took part in a series of games. In our case, as the size of the group increases,
participants respond less frequently to the outcomes of previous games. In addition,
while QRE continues to organize the individual spending levels well, the amount of
noise in choices increases. Taken together, these results indicate that the pro¯tability
of ra²e games even in rather small populations { in the case of our results, with four or
more participants { can be explained by a lack of strategic response to changes in the
number of other participants.
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the formal model of the game,
theoretical predictions, and laboratory procedures in Section 2. Section 3 describes the
experimental results. Section 4 considers behavioral theories and provides the main
results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion.
1The exception to this pattern is the study of Shogren and Baik (1991), who ¯nd that individ-
ual spending levels match the theoretical prediction; however, they used a design in which subjects
interacted in ¯xed pairs, so their results may be attributable to repeated game e®ects.
52 Theory and Experimental Design
2.1 Ra²e Game
We study a single-prize ra²e. There is a commonly-known number of players N, each of
whom has an endowment !. The value of the prize to be ra²ed is V . This value is the
same to all participants, and this fact is commonly known. Participants simultaneously
choose how many tickets to buy, with xi being the choice of participant i = 1;:::;N.
The price of a ticket is normalized to one. Each ticket is equally likely to be chosen;




j=1 xj.2 Consider player i and, for notational convenience, de¯ne the sum of other
players' choices as Yi =
P
j6=i xj. Assuming risk-neutrality, the expected payo® to
participant i is




2.2 Rationalizable choices and Nash equilibrium






V Yi ¡ Yi;0g: (2)
The best-response function is single-peaked and maximized at Yi = V








4 . Therefore, individual choices greater than V
4 are never best replies.
Tullock (1980) showed that the game has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which
x
?
1 = ::: = x
?
N = x
?(N) = V ¢
N ¡ 1
N2 : (3)
Note that when N = 2, then Yi = xj, where i 6= j and in the Nash equilibrium
x1 = x2 = V
4 , so the Nash equilibrium is equal to the maximum rationalizable spending
level.
2.3 Relative performance
Because of the competitive nature of the environment, it is plausible that subjects may
care about relative performance in addition to their own earnings level. Under this
2We assume that nobody gets the prize if x1 = ::: = xN = 0.
6assumption, subjects behavior would be explained by evolutionarily stable strategies
(ESS). Hehenkamp, Leininger, and Possajennikov (2004), based on the work of Scha®er
(1988, 1989), showed that, in a ¯nite population, the unique ESS for the game we study
is
x
ESS = V=N: (4)
This is greater than the Nash equilibrium for all values of N. The intution for this result
is that at the Nash equilibrium, an increase in spending decreases expected earnings, by
de¯nition; however, the increase in spending decreases other's earnings more than one's
own. Therefore, earnings of the agent who spends slightly more than the Nash level,
while others spend at the Nash level, are higher.
The Nash and ESS predictions di®er most greatly when N = 2, and the di®erence
decreases monotonically in N. Also, ESS predicts the ra²e will exactly break even for
all values of N.
2.4 Protocol
A total of 15 experimental sessions were conducted at PEEL (Pittsburgh Experimental
Economics Laboratory) using subjects recruited from the participant pool. There were
three sessions with each of the group sizes N = 2;3;4;5;9. Cohort sizes ranged from 12
to 22 subjects. Table 1 summarizes the sessions.
At the beginning of each session, the instructions (see Appendix B) were read aloud.
After the instructions were read and clarifying questions answered, subjects completed
a questionnaire to check their understanding. Keeping in mind Shogren and Baik's
(1991) use of expected-payo® tables, the instructions and questionnaire tested subjects'
understanding of the expected payo® consequences of choices. Therefore, maximization
of expected payo®s was implicitly suggested to subjects in a light-handed way.
Sessions consisted of 10 periods. Participants were randomly and anonymously as-
signed into groups of size N each period. In each period, each participant was given an
endowment ! = 1;200 tokens. Participants simultaneously selected an integer number
of tokens between 0 and 1,200 to spend on a prize worth V = 1;000 tokens. Conditional
on the amounts contributed, the prize was randomly allocated to one of the participants
in the group, with participant i winning the prize with probability
xi PN
j=1 xj, if xi > 0.
7N session subjects Nash ESS mean median > 250
2 2.1 18 250 500 350.89 300 94 (52%)
2 2.2 20 250 500 338.77 300 105 (53%)
2 2.3 12 250 500 286.68 200 52 (43%)
2 all 50 250 500 330.63 263 251 (50%)
3 3.1 12 222 333.4 240.80 200 48 (40%)
3 3.2 15 222 333.4 246.67 200 49 (33%)
3 3.3 12 222 333.4 361.27 200 54 (45%)
3 all 39 222 333.4 280.12 200 151 (39%)
4 4.1 20 188 250 276.78 200 75 (38%)
4 4.2 16 188 250 377.06 300 86 (54%)
4 4.3 16 188 250 253.51 200 66 (41%)
4 all 52 188 250 300.47 200 227 (44%)
5 5.1 20 160 200 311.81 200 77 (39%)
5 5.2 15 160 200 237.53 100 55 (37%)
5 5.3 15 160 200 417.27 329 83 (55%)
5 all 50 160 200 321.16 200 215 (43%)
9 9.1 18 99 111.11 379.56 200 75 (42%)
9 9.2 18 99 111.11 251.29 100 60 (33%)
9 9.3 18 99 111.11 347.78 200 85 (47%)
9 all 54 99 111.11 326.21 200 220 (41%)
Table 1: Summary of experimental sessions and results
8At the end of the 10 periods, one of the 10 periods was selected at random, and
subjects' earnings for this portion of the experimental session were determined by the
selected period with the exchange rate 100 tokens = $1. The experimental session then
continued with 40 rounds of unrelated games. The overall length of each session was
about two hours, with this portion comprising under an hour on average. In addition
to their earnings from the rounds, subjects received a $5 show-up fee.
3 Results
3.1 Data
Our experimental results are summarized in Table 1. Subjects chose spending levels
which were integer multiples of 100 in 1913 of the 2450 bids (78.1%), and multiples of
50 a further 236 times (9.6%); overall, 87.7% of choices were multiples of 50. We will
proceed with the data analysis using the frame in which subjects appear to process the
game. All choices are binned into bins k = 0;1;2;:::;12, where bin k consists of the
choices [k ¡ 50;k + 50). Figure 1 plots the empirical distributions of choices for each of
the group sizes. Choice patterns across all group sizes are qualitatively similar and there
is no clear ranking of the distributions in terms of ¯rst-order stochastic dominance.
Since the distribution of individual spending does not depend in a signi¯cant way on
the group size, it follows that total spending increases as the group size increases. For
group sizes N = 4;5, and 9, we ¯nd that total spending exceeds the value of the prize.
For example, the average spending for a randomly-constituted nine-person group in the
N = 9 treatment is 2935.89 tokens, for a prize worth only 1000 tokens. Our data and
available data from previous studies are summarized in Table 2 and Figure 2.3
3.2 Comparison to theoretical predictions
Figure 3 presents period-by-period average spending levels plotted relative to the Nash
equilibrium and ESS predictions. We observe that the average individual spending is
above the Nash equilibrium prediction in all periods in all treatments. Mean and median
levels of spending in the N = 2 and N = 3 treatments are roughly comparable to the
3In Table 2 and Figure 2 we normalize the prize values to V = 1;000 for other experiments.
























Figure 1: Empirical distribution of choices for N = 2;3;4;5;9, binned in intervals
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Figure 2: Summary of Lottery Experiments





Millner and Pratt (1989) 2 250 500 280 12.0 -44
Shogren and Baik (1991) 2 250 500 253.4 1.4 -49.3
Potters et al. (1998) 2 250 500 388.5 55.4 -22.3
Davis and Reilly (1998) 4 187.5 250 242.1 29.1 -3.2
2 250 500 448 79.2 -10.4
3 222 333.4 441.7 99 32.5
Anderson and Sta®ord (2003) 4 187.5 250 351.5 87.5 40.6
5 160 200 483.4 202.1 141.7
10 90 100 212.7 136.3 112.7
Fonseca 2 250 500 500.4 100.2 0.1
2 250 500 330.6 32.2 -33.9
3 222 333.4 280.1 26.2 -16
Our result 4 187.5 250 286.6 52.9 14.6
5 160 200 321.2 100.8 60.6
9 98.8 111.11 326.2 230.2 193.6
Table 2: Summary of Lottery Experiments
Nash prediction, but fail to track the Nash prediction for the larger group sizes. ESS is
a better predictor than the Nash equilibrium for N = 3 and N = 4, but it also makes
a poor prediction for N = 5 and N = 9. Note that as N increases, the di®erence
between these two predictions shrinks. Figure 3 indicates that subjects' behaviour in
small groups, N = 2 and N = 3, might be predicted by some weighted average of the
Nash equilibrium and ESS. However, it is no longer true for bigger groups, N = 4,
N = 5, and N = 9. Table 1 explains why it is the case: for all group sizes, 39% to 50%
of individual choices exceed the maximum rationalizable choice of 250. This proportion
does not vary systematically with group size.
4 Behavioral Predictions
Nash equilibrium and ESS do not do a satisfactory job of capturing the comparative
statistics in behavior with respect to the number of participants. Further, they are
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Figure 3: Period-by-period average spending levels.
12We therefore turn to behavioral concepts to get a better handle on the data.
We proceed by progressively relaxing assumptions. We start with quantal response
equilbrium, which maintains a mutual best-reply assumption while allowing for noisy
observation of expected payo®s. Removing the equilibrium assumption, we consider
models of level-k reasoning, where players exhibiting higher levels of strategic sophisti-
cation choose best responses to the play of players with lower levels of sophistication.
Finally, we look at period-by-period adjustment behavior using myopic heuristics, and
compare to the predictions of learning direction theory.
4.1 Quantal Response Equilibrium
The Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) concept of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) is
a widely-used model of noisy decision-making in games. In a QRE, each player observes
the expected payo® to each of his strategy choices with an idiosyncratic shock that is
not known to other players or the outside observer. In the most commonly-used version,
this noise term is assumed to be i.i.d. across players and strategies, and is drawn from
the extreme value distribution with precision parameter ¸. This results in the familiar
logit speci¯cation for choice probabilities (see, for example, Anderson, Goeree and Holt,
2002). To be more precise, if ui(x;¼) is the expected utility of player i to playing
choice x when all other players choose according to the mixed strategy pro¯le ¼, then
the probability player i will choose x is proportional to exp(¸ui(x;¼)). For ¸ = 0,
this reduces to uniform randomization over all strategies; as ¸ ! 1, the set of QRE
converges to a subset of the set of Nash equilibria.
The QRE concept has been successful in organizing data in laboratory games. An
implication of the QRE is that less costly \mistakes" are made with higher probability.
Therefore, in contrast with a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, a QRE predicts a prob-
ability distribution over strategies, with positive probability assigned to each strategy
in each player's strategy set. The model does this at the cost of the free parameter
¸. Following McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), it is customary to estimate the value of ¸
against experimental data by likelihood maximization.
Formally, a strategy pro¯le ¼ is a QRE with precision parameter ¸ if, for every






In the ra²e game, the expected payo® to spending x is




for x > 0, and ui(0;¼) = !, where the expectation is taken with respect to the mixed






= exp(¸(ui(x;¼) ¡ ui(0;¼))):
Therefore,








In operationalizing the QRE model, recall that spending levels which are multiples
of 100 predominate in the data. Therefore, we compute QRE on the discretized game
with spending levels f0;100;:::;1100;1200g to match the frame subjects appear to
use in approaching the game.4 The precision parameter ¸ is estimated via maximum
likelhiood for each group size N, with all choices in [k ¡ 50;k + 50) binned together as
choice k for each discretized spending level.
Table 3 presents, for each group size N, the count of the number of choices in each
bin, and the corresponding empirical frequency. Following these is the QRE ¯t by
maximum likelihood estimation, performed using the Gambit software (McKelvey et al.
2008), with the corresponding log-likelihood. Figure 4 illustrates the close relationship
between the distribution of spending levels in the data and the best-¯t QRE.
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Figure 4: Cumulative Distribution Functions.
The estimated QREs match the qualitative structure of the observed pattern of
individual spending levels. Both feature peaks in the distribution around x = 200, with
long, exponentially-decaying tails for high spending levels. In other words, the presence
of the non-rationalizable choices above 250 is well-organized by a logit model of choice.
The maximum likelihood estimates of ¸ decrease slowly as the group size increases.
Intuitively, the ¸ parameter in QRE controls the relative in°uence that expected pay-
o®s have on choices, as opposed to the e®ects of other, unobserved random in°uences.
Lower values of ¸ correspond to QREs where the unobserved payo® shocks have greater
variance, and therefore greater in°uence on observed choices. Our estimates are consis-
tent with the hypothesis that the ¯nancial consequences of actions are less important in
16determining behavior as group size increases.
This interpretation of the QRE does not shed light speci¯cally on why ¯nancial
consequences are less important. It is possible that the larger number of other players in
the group increases strategic uncertainty, or makes the strategic problem of formulating
a spending choice more di±cult.5 We now turn to other behavioral approaches for clues
as to why behavior becomes noisier, and moves further from Nash, as seen by QRE.
4.2 Level-k Reasoning
We now relax the equilibrium assumption which is embedded in QRE and consider the
data in light of level-k reasoning (see, e.g., Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Nagel, 1995;
Ho, Camerer and Weigelt, 1998; Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta, 2001; Costa-
Gomes and Crawford, 2006; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007). Following the custom in
the literature, we suppose that there are three player types. Speci¯cally, we follow the
method used by Ho, Camerer and Weigelt (1998) for games with a large strategy space.
Start with the assumption that the lowest, Level 0 (L0) players choose their spending
uniformly over [0;V ]. Level k > 0 (Lk) players are assumed to believe that all other
players are level Lk¡1 players who make their choices according to the density function
BLk¡1(x). Believing this, they mentally simulate N ¡1 draws from the density function















Lk¡1 is the i-th draw of a random variable BLk¡1.
The assumptions above allow us to calculate the density of each level type. Note
that since any choice greater than 250 is never a best reply to any choice in [0;1000],
the level-k density for any k > 0 is truncated at 250 (see Figure 6). Thus, level 0 should
be assigned to players who choose any number greater than 250. The crucial problem
is how to assign a level type to a player who chooses a number that di®erent types
might choose. Take the N = 2 case as a clarifying example. Suppose a player chooses
5We are not aware of any other studies which speci¯cally address how QRE estimates perform as
group sizes are systematically varied.
17N L0 L1 L2
2 36.00 60.00 4.00
3 26.32 65.79 7.89
4 51.92 40.38 7.69
5 64.00 20.00 16.00
9 96.30 1.85 1.85
Table 4: Proportions (1st-Round Data)
N L0 L1 L2
2 48.00 52.00 0.00
3 36.84 60.53 2.63
4 75.00 17.31 7.69
5 76.00 6.00 18.00
9 90.74 0 9.26
Table 5: Proportions (All-Rounds Data)
200. This choice could come from a L0 player, from a L1 player or from a L2 player.
Following Ho, Camerer and Weigelt (1998), we assign this choice to a level-k if and only
if this level-k type is more likely to have made that choice than any other level types.
Since BL1(200) > BL2(200) > BL0(200), we assign choice 200 to level-1.
Table 4 reports the proportions for each level, using ¯rst-round data. The proportion
of L2 type players is small for any N = 2;3;4;5;9. Furthermore, as N increases, the
proportion of L0 type increases and the proportion of L1 type decreases. When N = 9,
more than 90% of the subjects are the L0 type. This observation is very surprising, as we
are not aware of any paper in the level-k reasoning literature with similar results. These
features are observed not only in the ¯rst round, but also when considering spending
levels from all rounds.
We follow the methodology of Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2001) to classify subjects
whose choices can be consistently identi¯ed as ¯tting into one of the behavior types. We
count how many times subject's spending levels are consistent with one of the types.
Subjects are classi¯ed into a particular type if their behavior is consistent with that
type in at least 6 out of the 10 rounds. If there is a tie between two or more types, we
classify that subject to the highest type. This classi¯cation method is biased in favor of
higher-level types. Using this classi¯cation method, we ¯nd that more than 90% of the
subjects are L0 type when N = 9 (see Table 5).
Do subjects iteratively eliminate dominated strategies over time in our experiments,
as has been shown, for example, in beauty contest games (Nagel, 1995)? To answer
this question, we assume that L0 learners simply choose the best-response against a
weighted average of choices in previous rounds. L1 learners assume all others are L0
learners and best respond to anticipated choices by L0 learners. L2 learners best respond
18to L1 learners. This approach predicts that no level types choose numbers greater than
250 after the ¯rst round. However, choices greater than 250 are observed over all rounds
for all N = 2;3;4;5;9 (see Table 6). Subjects do not learn to eliminate dominated
strategies in the ra²e game. The distributions of spending levels plotted in Figure 5
show that there is no convergence to any one spending level over time.
N Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
# > 250 18 25 30 29 26 22 24 28 24 25 251
2 Total Subjects 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 500
% > 250 36 50 60 58 52 44 48 56 48 50 50
# > 250 10 10 18 20 16 14 12 16 15 17 151
3 Total Subjects 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 380
% > 250 26 26 47 53 42 37 32 42 39 45 39
# > 250 14 20 25 24 26 25 28 21 22 22 227
4 Total Subjects 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 520
% > 250 27 38 48 46 50 48 54 40 42 42 44
# > 250 15 23 23 24 21 23 23 20 25 18 251
5 Total Subjects 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 500
% > 250 30 46 46 48 42 46 46 40 50 36 43
# > 250 19 26 25 24 27 23 18 21 16 21 220
9 Total Subjects 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 540
% > 250 35 48 46 44 50 43 33 39 30 39 41
Table 6: Choices > 250 over Rounds
4.3 Adaptation and Learning Direction Theory
Selten and Buchta (1994) proposed a simple heuristic model in which agents adjust
their choices in response to recent experience. Learning direction theory applies to
games where strategy spaces have a clear ordering, such as when strategies are indexed
by numbers. The theory asserts that, given an action pro¯le fatg played in period t,
a subject will choose an action a
t+1
i in the subsequent period which is closer in the
strategy space to the best response against the previous-period choices of others, fat
¡ig.
We apply two formulations of learning direction theory to organize adaptive behavior





























































































































































































































































Figure 5: Subjects' Choices over Rounds.
20We divide all choices after the ¯rst period based on whether the subject making
the choice won the prize in the previous period. In each category, we further segregate
choices based on whether the subject chose a di®erent spending level than in the previous
period. Among those periods where spending levels changed, we tabulate two measures.
To get a general sense of whether adaptation over time tends to increase or decrease
spending levels, we count the number of times the spending levels increased or decreased
relative to the previous period. To speci¯cally test learning direction theory, we tabulate
whether subjects' choices moved in the direction predicted by learning direction theory,
i.e., in the direction of better responses. Table 7 summarizes these measures.
We observe that adaptation in small lotteries di®ers from their larger counterparts
in two ways. When the number of players is small, players who lost the previous lottery
are much more likely to change their choice in the following period compared to players
who won the previous lottery. Losing the lottery when the group is small is a stronger
stimulus than winning. With larger groups, the asymmetry in response to the lottery
disappears, with changes in spending levels occurring equally often after wins and losses.
The relative frequency of increases and decreases in spending levels after wins and losses
is consistent with a regret explanation. A win is evidence that one has \overpaid," and
therefore reduction in the spending level is in order; a loss is evidence that one has not
been aggressive enough, and therefore an increase in spending is indicated.
Table 7 illustrates that when the number of players is small, adjustments tend to
be in the direction of the best response. As the size of the group increases, the trend
is towards random adjustments, with adjustments in the direction of the best response
being no more likely than adjustments away from the best response.
Both these trends point to the same conclusion. In small lotteries, the event of
losing the lottery is salient, because one expects to win roughly 1
N of the lotteries one
enters. Losing a lottery in a larger group is less surprising, and so is less of a stimulus.
Adaptation in larger group sizes is therefore correspondingly weaker, and changes, both
in raw spending levels and in the reliability of moving in the direction of expected-
payo®-increasing choices, are more random.
21Outcome Direction N = 2 N = 3 N = 4 N = 5 N = 9
Won Total 75 103 118 95 26
No change 43 (57%) 53 (52%) 56 (48%) 46 (48%) 10 (39%)
Higher 9 16 22 21 8







Lost Total 87 248 350 355 298
No change 28 (32%) 102 (41%) 121 (35%) 173 (49%) 131 (44%)
Higher 37 82 124 102 85







Table 7: Summary of data for testing learning direction theory.
5 Discussion
We show that in a laboratory setting, individual spending in ra²es does not decrease as
the number of participants increases. Therefore, the prediction that total expenditure
will not exceed the prize fails to hold. We show that this can occur at a surprisingly
small group size, with only four participants. The observation in the ¯eld that big-money
lotteries and smaller ra²es can be pro¯table can be replicated in the laboratory without
resorting to very large groups, or to life-changing prize amounts o®ering a \chance to
buy hope."
We organize the data using several behavioral models to investigate the micro-level
structure of spending choices underlying the result. These models all point to a simi-
lar conclusion: as the number of participants in a ra²e increases, choices become less
correlated with the underlying ¯nancial incentives in the experiment. This is consis-
tent both with increased strategic uncertainty regarding the play of a larger number of
coplayers, as well as the weaker ex-post incentive signals received from winning or losing
the ra²e. This disconnect from earnings results in less adaptation of choices and in-
creased apparent randomness in play, which taken together underlie the observed levels
of spending.
22A Calculations for Level-k Distributions (N=2)
In this section, we show how to get Level-k distributions. We only provide the detailed
calculations for N = 2.6 We suppose that the L0 type is uniformly distributed on the
interval [0;1000]. To get the distribution for L1 type, let x be a random variable that
follows the uniform distribution on the interval [0;1000]. From the best-reply property
(5), a random variable of L1 type, denoted by y, satis¯es the following:
h(x) = y =
p
1000x ¡ x:
Then the distribution function of the random variable y is
Fy(y)=Pr(h(x) · y)




2 ¡ 2(500 ¡ y)x + y
2 ¸ 0)
=1 ¡ Fx((500 ¡ y) +
p
500(500 ¡ 2y)) + Fx((500 ¡ y) ¡
p
500(500 ¡ 2y)):
The density function of y is
fy(y) = fx((500 ¡ y) ¡
p





+fx((500 ¡ y) +
p












500(500¡2y); y 2 [0;250)
0; otherwise.
(6)
Given the density function (6) and the best-reply property (5), a random variable of L2
type, denoted by z, satis¯es the following:
g(y) = z =
p
1000y ¡ y:
Then, the distribution function of the random variable z is
Fz(z)=Pr(g(y) · z)
=1 ¡ Fy((500 ¡ z) +
p
500(500 ¡ 2z)) + Fy((500 ¡ z) ¡
p
500(500 ¡ 2z)):
6The calculations for N = 3;4;5;9 are available upon request.












500¡2z); y 2 [0;250)
0; otherwise.
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Figure 6: Densities
Figure 6 illustrates all densities.
24B Appendix: Instruction (N=3)
This is an experiment related to economic decision making. Over approximately the
next hour and a half, you will be asked to participate in several lottery games. For
simply showing up to this experiment you have already received a °at sum of $5. In
addition, the decisions you make and your luck in the lottery will determine your ¯nal
monetary payo® for this experiment session, which in fact, may total as much as $27 (in-
cluding the show up fee). You will be paid in private once the session has been completed.
There are several people participating in this session. However, during any particular
round, you will be competing against only two other people, identi¯ed by participant
numbers. It is extremely important that you do not communicate with any of the other
subjects. If at any time you have a question, please raise your hand and if need be, I will
come over to where you are sitting in order to answer your question privately. There
will be a lottery game and it will be played for 10 rounds.
Lottery Prize
In every game in which you will participate, the lottery prize is equal to 1,000 tokens.
At the beginning of each round, you will have 1,200 tokens and the opportunity to choose
the number of tokens you would like to contribute to the lottery game. Keep in mind that
one token corresponds to one lottery game ball and another chance to win the lottery
prize. After all contributions are noted on the contribution slip and on your computer
screen, a winner will be selected at random. After all 10 rounds have been completed,
one lottery round from among those played will be chosen at random and you will be
compensated in dollars according to your token earnings during the selected round (plus
the $5 for participating, which you have already received). To be more speci¯c, you will
earn $1 for every 100 token remaining in your private fund (calculated as simply your
initial wealth of 1,200 tokens minus the number of tokens you chose to contribute to the
lottery game). Additionally, you will earn $10 more if you win during that round. For
example, if you chose to contribute 100 tokens during the selected round, your private
wealth will be 1,100 tokens (1,200 - 100), plus your lottery winnings, if applicable. If
you won the lottery, your total token wealth at the end of the round would be equal
25to 2,100 (1,100 + 1,000). Your total dollar payo® would be equal to your tokens times
the exchange rate plus the additional $5 simply for participating in the experiment. If
the describe outcome happens in the selected round your total dollar payo® would be
equal to your token times the exchange rate, namely $21, plus the additional $5 for
participating in the experiment. If these instructions are unclear, please raise your hand
now. If not, we will begin the ¯rst lottery.
1-10 rounds: Lottery Game
The lottery prize is equal to 1,000 tokens. You have 1,200 tokens, 2 opponents, and
the opportunity to choose the number of tokens you would like to contribute to the
lottery game. Keep in mind that one token corresponds to one lottery game ball and
another chance to win the lottery prize. If you contribute X tokens and your opponents
TOGETHER contribute Y tokens, your chance to win the lottery is X
X+Y .
QUIZ 1
1. Assume that your contribution is 100 tokens and your opponents' total contribution
is 900 tokens. What is your chance to win the lottery?
(a) 100 / 900
(b) 100 / 1,000
(c) 100 / 800
(d) 800 / 900
(e) 900 / 1,000
2. Assume that your contribution is 900 tokens and your opponents' total contribu-
tion is 100 tokens. What is your chance to win the lottery?
(a) 100 / 900
(b) 100 / 1,000
(c) 800 / 900
(d) 900 / 1,000
(e) 900 / 900
26Your expected payo® in each round is (Your probability to win the prize) times (The




3. Assume that your contribution is 100 tokens and your opponents' total contribution






4. Assume that your contribution is 900 tokens and your opponents' total contribu-
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